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Abstract: The aim of the research detailed in this paper is to model and ultimately to improve the
relationships that occur between individuals transacting across organization boundaries in supply
chain networks and/or virtual partnerships. Opportunistic behaviour and/or repetitive patterns of
behavioural actions, resulting in gamesmanship, are explored to determine whether, under certain
situations, the behaviours lead to win–lose situations and reduced trust. Transactional analysis (TA)
is used to model games, which have been identified and observed in collaborating industrial
partners. The experiments carried out to date have led to the formation of a preliminary
relationship model which can be used, firstly, to identify correlations to the established library of
TA games and hence, secondly, to investigate methods of mitigating the effect of some of the more
negative form of games. It is proposed that this technique can be used as a mediating tool within
holonic manufacturing systems or, at the ultimate, result in the establishment of relationship holons
that could establish and maintain standardized co-operative patterns of behaviour between
interacting partners, or holons, in the supply chain.
Keywords: transactional analysis, supply chain networks, organization boundaries, virtual partner-
ships, mediating tool, holonic manufacturing systems
1 INTRODUCTION
Within any supply chain network, individual interactions
often suffer from the problem of ‘local optimization’ at the
expense of overall system optimization. Within holonic
manufacturing systems where supportive collaboration
between interacting holons is a fundamental requirement,
such ‘local optimization’ is clearly counterproductive. The
research presented in this paper focuses on interactions at
the individual level in order to determine the nature of the
relationships between collaborating individuals who co-
operate across company boundaries within networks of
companies. It was hypothesized that the quality of the
relationships between these individuals has a fundamental
effect upon business success. This is based on the recogni-
tion that in these relationships there is a great potential for
psychological behaviour to occur that can result in one
business partner winning in a sensitive problem situation
while another loses. The initial work concentrated on
assessing whether this form of win–lose behaviour does
occur, under what particular circumstances, what influ-
ences it and whether the approach based on transactional
analysis (TA) can be used as an effective tool for model-
ling and explaining the behaviour. The aim is to raise
understanding of relationship issues in order, firstly, to
aid management in managing relationships to achieve
mutual benefit and, secondly, to suggest a route to the
establishment of relationship holons whose function
would be to establish and monitor behavioural patterns
for business relationships [1, 2].
2 RESEARCH CONTEXT
All businesses have complex internal networks of
relationships between individuals and groups and at
different levels in the organization. They also have
partnerships and relationships that extend beyond the
boundaries of the company with regulatory agencies,
employment agencies, customers, suppliers and partners.
With many of the regulatory agencies the business has
relatively little power and it has to abide by the rules
that are defined. However, with other collaborators
and sometimes with customers the business exercises
power by defining the rules of partnership in its favour
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and sometimes by controlling the purchasing behaviour
of customers by, for example, a ‘lock-in’ strategy. The
ultimate aim of the business is always to maximize
power within the supply network.
2.1 Power in the supply network
The issue of power in supply networks has been explored
by Cox [3], Cox et al. [4], Jablin et al. [5], Conrad [6] and
Pfeffer [7], among many others. Dahl’s [8] definition of
power is the capacity of actor A to get actor B to do
something that actor B would probably not do—if not
influenced to do so. According to Cox, the buyer is
dominant when the utility and scarcity of the buyer’s
resources relevant to the supplier are high. When this
situation is reversed and the utility and scarcity of the
supplier’s resources relevant to the buyer are low, then
the supplier takes a dominant role. In Cox’s view, wield-
ing power is not a negative process but an essential
element of strategy and planning. All firms attempt to
frame their relationships with outside bodies to their
own advantage. This advantage is designed to maximize
their own revenue and to keep competitors out. Accord-
ing to Teece [9], who describes the resource based view of
business, power can be established if the business has
some advantage that is difficult for others to imitate
but is much in need. This could be access to a key
resource or a competence in some technology [10].
Having and wielding power do not necessarily have
negative connotations for others in the relationship. It
is really about how the business uses its power. All com-
panies exist in a variety of relationships some where they
do have dominant power and many where they do not.
The issue of power is usually accepted as a natural
element of collaboration and many companies accept
reasonable rules and conditions applied by their more
larger and powerful collaborator. However, the situation
becomes difficult if power is applied in an inappropriate
manner. In such circumstances, less dominant partners
stand to lose a considerable amount if they cannot
influence the situation. An example for the potential
inappropriate application of power would be where a
consignment of goods has been received but is now no
longer required by the receiving company. If the receiv-
ing company is dominant in this relationship then it
may be tempted to maximize its own position by trans-
ferring responsibility for over-supply to the supplier.
Alternatively, it could blame the supplier for a quality
or delivery fault. Thus, while power has value in that it
enables a business to optimize strategically its relation-
ship in favour of its preferred strategy, it can also be
used inappropriately in a manner that causes damage
to a relationship. It is obvious to any outside observer
that the inappropriate application of power in such
circumstances would result in long-term disadvantage
to both parties. However, to the individuals concerned
in the transactions, the distracted long-term view may
be difficult to maintain. Shorter-term considerations
can become dominant, in which case inappropriate
gamesmanship occurs based primarily on the balance
of power in the supply network.
2.2 Opportunistic behaviour
In contrast to power relationships there also exists
opportunistic behaviour within supply networks. This
typically involves one partner having access to knowl-
edge that the other partner does not have and then
taking advantage of the knowledge asymmetry to gain
a business advantage. Jap [11] has explored opportunistic
behaviour. Her determinants of this behaviour are
suspicion of opportunistic behaviour, asymmetrical
knowledge (one party knowing more than the other)
and poor distributive justice in the past. A variety of
behaviours can occur between partners involving oppor-
tunistic jostling in order to change the power balance in
the supply network or to achieve a one-off advantage.
Similar to the inappropriate application of power dis-
cussed in the previous section, an injudicious approach
to opportunistic jostling is likely to risk the demise of
the long-term relationship [12].
Jap explored the mechanisms of governance that
control opportunistic behaviour. According to Jap, the
factors that tend to limit opportunistic behaviour between
parties are trust, bilateral investments and shared goals. If
the parties involved have established a trust relationship
over a prolonged period of time, then this tends to limit
opportunistic behaviour and to encourage more open
communication. If they have bilateral and shared invest-
ments in the collaboration with shared goals, then this
also limits opportunistic behaviour.
2.3 Exit or voice relationship
Whether dominant or less powerful, all parties in a supply
network may be suspicious of both the inappropriate use
of power and opportunistic behaviour. If either occurs
and is identified, they are unlikely to accept this situation
willingly. How they choose to respond depends upon a
number of factors. It depends upon the nature of the
relationship. If, as Hirschman [13] and Helper [14] say,
the relationship is exit in type, i.e. the two companies in
the relationship are not fundamentally dependent upon
each other, then typically they will end the relation-
ship—probably relatively quickly and easily. However, if
there is a voice relationship, i.e. the companies are inter-
dependent, then there is a strong incentive of self-interest
to stay in the relationship and to attempt to resolve any
problem issues. The exit relationship leads to rapid termi-
nation of the relationship but the voice relationship is
likely to lead to interaction, the pattern of which will
depend upon the characteristics of the relationship.
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2.4 Behaviours in relationships and situational strengths
A network of interactions involves many relationships,
some transitory and some more permanent, both inside
the company and external to it. Many regular transactions
take place at a factual and non-psychological level
involving simple day-to-day transactions. However,
others occur at a deeper level during negotiation or if
there is an issue to be resolved. In such situations there
is a strong potential for inappropriate use of power or
opportunistic behaviour to emerge depending on how
both parties in the relationship choose to behave. (In
this sense, behaviour is defined as a sequence of actions
that an individual within a company carries out in
response to a situational stimulus.) The personal disposi-
tion of the individual and the constraints of the work
situation combine to become fundamental to determining
the behaviour in the relationship. The person will exhibit
preferred personal ways of behaving which may be more
evident in stressful situations involving problems or
delicate negotiations. It is this factor that is fundamental
in creating gamesmanship situations which, while appear-
ing sensible to the individual concerned, are detrimental to
long-term business-to-business relationships.
In addition, no matter what the individual predisposi-
tions are to behave in certain ways, the environment in
which a person works will effect their response to a
greater or lesser extent. The work situation is very differ-
ent from, for example, the family relationship. At work,
people are within a hierarchy of power relationships,
people progress in the organization by meeting appraisal
targets, the organization they work for is efficiency
oriented and the individuals work to targets. They lack
fundamental freedoms to determine their own actions.
To explain this restriction to freedom of action for the
individual the concept of situational strength has value
[15, 16]. In the strong situation the decision latitude
available to the individual is small and behaviour is
largely prescribed by organization policy or some rule
set. This situation can be conceptualized as red traffic
lights where everybody (most at least) knows the rules
of the lights and obeys them—with sanctions if they do
not (if they are caught). The ambiguity in decisions to
be made is low and the rule set defining behaviour is
high. Under these circumstances, people, no matter
what their predisposition, tend to behave in a similar
manner under the same stimulus. The opposite to the
strong situation is the weak situation when there is
high degree of latitude in decision making and the
actual decisions that emerge depend more upon indivi-
duals’ preferred ways of behaving.
However, it would be wrong to assume that the
individual has no influence on the situation strength.
There is a mutual interaction between situation strength
and the individual disposition to behave in certain ways.
One strategy for a manager may be to try to engineer
the situation so that they personally have considerable
freedom in their decision making while they ensure that
the situation is strong for their own subordinates.
A further issue is that of discretion which has been
explored by Hambrick and Finkelstein [17]. The percep-
tion of the strength of a situation is related to the person-
ality of the individuals and it is likely that certain people
who prefer stronger situations will deliberately select
positions where the discretion in decisionmaking is largely
controlled by company policies. In contrast, others may
prefer weaker situations and they either engineer or
choose the situation to suit their personality. Hambrick
and Finkelstein identified that strong situations often
correlate with older chief executive officers promoted
from within, low executive remuneration, little use of
incentive schemes, stable strategy and large firms. The
person will follow prescribed behaviours when the situa-
tion dictates and these behaviours will have been learnt
over a significant time period. They will involve an align-
ment of individual behaviours and the organization’s
proceduralized and preferred ways of behaving.
In the research described in this paper the commonly
held view was accepted that, in a weak situation, indivi-
duals involved in transactions adopt patterns based upon
their own predispositions, maximizing their own power,
access to information or political influence and that, in a
strong situation, the organization or group provide
strong guidelines and will sanction people if they
depart from the guidelines. In the strong situation the
organization ensures that a certain behaviour results
when a stimulus occurs. The organization may do this
because it needs controlled and predictable responses
for safety reasons, to minimize damage resulting from
an adverse situation, or to guarantee particular perfor-
mance levels.
In both strong and weak situations the interaction
between an individual’s predisposition for behaviour
and the prescribed behaviours preferred by the organiza-
tion is complex. People with certain trait patterns will
seek to maximize their own situation regardless of the
strength of the overall situation; others will prefer to
work in environments having particular situation
strengths and they will seek employment in companies
offering these conditions. A model of these interactions
between individuals in collaborating organizations is
shown in Fig. 1. The figure depicts the process of two
organizations transacting in a supply network relation-
ship. The relative power between the two organizations
and the effect of situation strength will influence the
choice of game played and whether persons representing
the organizations play their own game or play the
organization’s game.
2.5 Games
The behaviour between individuals in the organization,
or when they are acting as proxy for the organization,
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involves transactions of primarily verbal and electronic
communication. However, behind this communication
there is a significant element of psychological message,
e.g. when the communication becomes abusive and
loaded with feeling. According to Jablin et al. [5],
language games are used by organizational actors to
disguise their political intentions, to mobilize support
and to provide opposition. Various games were identified
by Burawoy [18], such as ‘making out’ games to compen-
sate for loss of control over the labour process. Such
behaviour may appear to the detached observer as not
being predetermined nor having objectives but it is
rational to the actors with respect to the decisions that
they make. For example, an individual may enter an
organization with every intention of being productive
but may be pressurized to behave in certain ways and
to limit their work output. They may have to choose
between a strategy of being productive and to risk
group sanction or to join in the group game. These
organizational games exist within all companies, between
individuals and between groups. They also occur
between collaborating organizations. Inherently, the
complex issue of power is involved—power that may
shift and move as the game is played so that an individual
that started as the dominant partner may not be the
dominant partner at the end of the game.
In the organization, a person exists in a complex
network of games; sometimes they are the victim of the
game and sometimes they strategically manipulate the
game to their own advantage. In many respects, how
they progress within the organization and gain power
depends upon their skill to manipulate strategically the
games to their own advantage. Games can exist as sur-
face phenomena, such as political games defining the
frame of reference for the individual in the organization,
e.g. networking to achieve empire building [19]. The
games can be intra-organizational, between groups or
between individuals and the dominant coalition, e.g.
‘them-and-us’ games, or the games can be deeply
embedded inside the organization representing the
social reality of the organization and not always within
the conscious knowledge of the participants. They are
designed to maintain power balances. A further discus-
sion of these levels of games has been provided by
Frost [20].
2.6 Transactional analysis
The belief in this research was that the techniques of TA
could be used to model the interactions between commu-
nicating individuals. TA as originally developed by
Berne [21, 22] applied to weak situations involving
script messages coming from the parent, adult or child
states of the individual. The parent applies injunctions
and judgements. The adult is factual with absence of
Fig. 1 Two organizations in a supply network relationship
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feeling. The child is emotional and feeling. According
to Berne, people can speak from a number of identi-
fiable script positions related to where they perceive
themselves to be in the parent, adult or child spectrum.
In weak situations it is individual preferences about
behaviour (and how others see them) that have
the most significance and determine the response
patterns.
In the strong situation, Berne recognized that the
organization pathology will be dominant. The etiquette,
i.e. organization procedures and rules, define the stages
and verbal patterns of any transaction. The etiquette is
the parent or traditional aspect of group culture; it
enforces the social contract and provides form to the
group process. Berne therefore extended TA theory to
the organization and in the process defined the etiquette
(corresponding to the parent), the technical culture
(corresponding to the adult) and the character (corre-
sponding to the child). The technical culture is the
rational aspect and consists of whatever scientific/
technical knowledge and skill is required to carry out
the group activity. Character, the emotional part of the
culture, consists of those behaviours permitted by the
etiquette.
Fischer [23] described the job of the organizational
etiquette to be that of setting policies and behavioural
rules. It takes information from its external environment
and internal systems and transforms it into policies and
behavioural rules for the technical culture and character.
This theory was also put forth by Blakeney [24] who pro-
posed that organizations are open and social systems.
They interact with the external environment, they take
in energy inputs (stimuli, in TA terms) and use internal
processes and structures (ego states) to transform them
and to make energy outputs (responses). He also pro-
poses that every system consists of subsystems each
having ego states.
Most communications between buyers and sellers in
networks will involve some directives from the company
about how to behave, combined with response patterns
determined and controlled by the transacting indivi-
duals. The organizational script and the individual
script will interact depending upon respective powers
and dispositions. No individual is going to accept com-
pletely the company injunction about behaviour, and
in most cases the company would not want this. How-
ever, in some situations, and particularly in those of
high risk, then the behaviour patterns in response to
situational stimuli are strictly controlled by the organiza-
tion and frequently rehearsed to ensure that they are
correctly carried out. In these situations, ambiguity is
removed as far as possible.
TA is a powerful tool for displaying and analysing
transaction patterns. As its origins arose from the
therapeutic counselling of couples, it has been shown to
be highly effective in conflict resolution. At issue is
how much modification of the TA theory is needed to
make it applicable and useful within the organizational
context.
2.7 Organization games
There are many ways in which the individual interacts
with his/her work organization and both attempt to
manipulate each other to obtain what each desires.
Early examination of these relationships has confirmed
that opportunistic behaviour does take place particu-
larly in situations where one party needs to win; this
causes some form of game to take place. Rather than
looking at these games from a mathematical sense as
in game theory, the major interest is with the psycho-
logical transactions and whether the technique of TA
can be used as a reasonable modelling tool to represent
the pattern of transactions. In TA terms a game has a
definite sequence of activity typically involving a pattern
of transactions, a switch, for example, where the victim
becomes the persecutor and a negative pay-off for one
of the parties. In this sense a game may not involve
all stages but may involve a regular pattern of inter-
actions, some corresponding to the Berne games, some
being collusive in nature and some simply being a
regular repeating pattern of transactions that this
person or organization frequently exhibits under the
same stimulus.
2.8 The games
Games taking place in the organization as a consequence
of either individual or organizational characteristics may
gain short-term benefit for the more powerful partner
but in the long term may lead to loss of trust and
higher risk of relationship failure. Since honest colla-
boration is more desirable in maximizing long-term
mutual performance, then the game-like behaviour has
to be recognized and attempts made to change the
unhelpful aspects of this behaviour. Returning to the
concept of holons at this stage may prove useful. A
fundamental aspect of a holonic system is that all the
holons must operate in a co-operative environment in
order to achieve whole system optimization. Unfortu-
nately, for the theorists, this takes no account of the
individuality of human nature. Individuals within
holons, transacting across holonic boundaries, may
develop personal games strategies which do not support,
and may indeed damage, whole system optimization.
Thus, at one level, managers need to be able to predict
and identify non-beneficial games in order to ‘defuse’
them; at a second level the concept may lead to the
potential development of a relationship holon which
establishes and monitors mutually beneficial behavioural
standards, or codes of conduct, during negotiations or
problem resolution. Such systems can never remove the
human element in the relationship but at least they
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could define a standard approach in the business to
conduct relationship behaviours.
3 CASE STUDIES
There are a number of questions that arise from the
research that attempts are made to answer:
1. Are transactions between individuals strongly influ-
enced by the situational context and the power
relations in the organizations?
2. Where the manipulation of power in the organization
is realized as games, is TA a valid representation of
these games?
3. If the games arise from the individual or the organiza-
tion, is this contingent upon the strength of the
situation?
To gather data to answer these questions a qualitative
study was carried out involving both semistructured and
structured interviews with people involved in network
relationships. The initial purpose was to determine
whether the model proposed and shown in Fig. 1 was a
reasonably accurate representation of transactions. If
verified, it was then intended to identify whether specific
company policies and communication patterns lead to
repetitive patterns of behaviour among supply chain
entities. Finally it was intended to provide managers
with the resulting insight into games being played in
order that they could better understand and thus
manage the situation. Studies have taken place in organi-
zations involved in:
(a) electronic reverse auctions between buyers and sup-
pliers,
(b) supply chain interactions between food product
suppliers and buyers and
(c) supply chain interactions between automotive sup-
pliers and buyers.
3.1 Case study 1: electronic auctions
The electronic auction is an important new means of
trading that has been made possible by the internet. It
resembles a reverse bidding process where potential
suppliers of goods or services compete with one another
to offer the lowest price. A deadline on the bidding is
imposed on suppliers all of whom can see each other’s
bids on the internet. In many respects, electronic auctions
change the rules of engagement in supplier to buyer rela-
tionships. The auction process apparently gives greater
power to the purchaser, particularly enabling them to
force down prices. However, in reality, suppliers develop
new rules of engagement in order to find ways of exerting
and developing their own power.
Discussions were held with a number of buyers who do
business by means of reverse auctions and they were
asked to describe qualitatively how suppliers and pur-
chasers behave during the auction. Most of the auctions
were conducted in a reasonable manner although they
did not always realize the savings planned and they
seemed to do little for longer-term trading partnerships.
However, it does appear that suppliers do attempt to
maximize their power in the relationship with the pur-
chaser in order to maximize their own advantage. The
situational strength in a reverse auction would appear
to be strong in that the rules of engagement are defined
and controlled by the purchaser and there is not much
opportunity for supplier discretion other than deciding
whether or not to bid and what price to bid.
In discussions with a major producer of motor vehicles
the following procedure was identified at the company:
1. The invitation to bid was issued and a pre-qualifica-
tion process took place.
2. Only those capable of satisfying the quality and
delivery requirements were invited to bid against a
specification issued by the buyer.
3. The auction was limited in terms of time; generally the
bidding was slow in the first half-hour but then
speeded up as the time passed and the participants
of the auction gained knowledge of the bid levels
from the other participants.
4. As the deadline approached, the bidding accelerated,
culminating in a frantic final 5min as suppliers decide
whether they are willing to reduce their price finally to
win the contract.
The strategies adopted by the suppliers can be surpris-
ing and at first sight counter-intuitive. They are aimed at
increasing their own power in relation to the other sup-
pliers and/or the purchaser.
A variety of games have been observed:
1. Collaboration. Suppliers form a group that bids as
one unit and then, when the work is awarded, they
divide it up between themselves. By being a more
unified entity the bargaining power of the suppliers
is increased.
2. Collusion. The buyer implies to a favoured supplier
that an aggressive approach to price reduction which
forces other suppliers to reduce their bids could win
future favour.
3. Loss leader. The supplier bids very low in the
knowledge that, if it wins the order, the purchaser
will be locked in and it will have to purchase spares
and maintenance from the supplier. The supplier is
making a strategic judgement about the value of the
work based upon power acquired when the buyer’s
switching costs are high.
4. Jostling for advantage. An incumbent long-term
supplier may be under pressure to bid in an auction
to retain its position as supplier. This is clearly a
mechanism for the purchaser to exert power on the
supplier. The supplier makes a calculated decision
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about the buyer’s cost of switching and sometimes
backs out of the auction just before it takes place.
This can place significant pressure on the buyer
since they may not, in reality, wish to switch supplier.
Both parties participate in a complex jostling activity
to gain advantage.
A typical case that was modelled using TA for the loss
leader is shown in Fig. 2. In this case the flow of informa-
tion took place as follows:
1. The buyer opens the game by providing the opportu-
nity for the supplier to bid for the work. Generally
this was carried out as an adult-to-adult transaction,
although in some instances, when the buyer exerted
power, it was more parent to child. This is shown as
transaction 1 in Fig. 2.
2. The buyer, which in this case had more power,
specified the terms and conditions of the auction to
gain maximum advantage. In that the buyer is setting
the rules, this is shown as the parent-to-child trans-
action 2.
3. The supplier bids low primarily to win the order but
with an ulterior motive of gaining control at a later
stage when the buyer is locked into the supplier. At
the social level the supplier responds from the less
dominant position of child to parent, shown as trans-
action 3. However, there is an unspoken strategy in
the supplier to gain some power at a future date.
4. If the game is played over a time period, then even-
tually the supplier will have some dominance due to
the lock-in situation. If the supplier’s strategy works,
then it will at some future time gain power, enabling
it to continue social communication as the adult-to-
adult transaction 4 while the ulterior unspoken
message is parent-to-child transaction 5.
These behavioural strategies are an attempt by the
supplier and the buyer to maximize their benefit. How-
ever, it carries a risk for the supplier of miscalculation
that could lead to a future loss of business and for the
buyer the risk of increasing costs. Some form of strategic
gamesmanship is inevitable in these situations and a code
of conduct is needed to define what is an acceptable game
and what is not. Such a code of conduct could be written
into the ‘rules’ of the auction or indeed in holonic terms.
In the case of the latter a standard relationship holon for
the auction environment would be defined which would
set the minimum standard for behaviour patterns and
outcomes. The purpose of the holon would be to limit
opportunistic behaviour and to build up trust. To be
successful its benefits to all parties would have to be
clearly recognizable.
3.2 Case study 2: searching for a quality problem
This scenario was described by the buyer in the transac-
tion. One company supplied raw ingredients to a manu-
facturer of food products. To ensure that the buyer
received a consistent and regular supply of the material
a call-off arrangement had been negotiated. The supplier
produces and sends an ingredient to the buyer working
to an agreed forecast of requirement plus or minus an
amount depending upon the agreed tolerance.
Most of the transactions between buyer and supplier
were factual and in TA terms adult to adult within a
well-defined etiquette. Game-like behaviour to gain
advantage was only evident in those relatively rare
problem situations that arose between the buyer and
the supplier. One particular problem that did occur
was a case where the buyer received more product
from the supplier than was actually needed in the
period even though the amount supplied was still
within the pre-agreed call-off tolerance. In terms of situa-
tion strength the buying company operated perfectly
within the defined terms of contract and therefore at
first sight seemed to demonstrate a strong situational
strength. However, individual buyers did have some
latitude to interpret the framework, leading to some
ambiguity in decision making and thus in reality operat-
ing to a weak situational strength.
Because of the contractual agreement they could reject
any consignment supplied if they found a quality problem.
The buyer used this clause to increase its power by
searching very hard to find a quality problem of any
sort to enable them to reject the consignment. Nearly
every time they did find some quality issue on which to
base a decision to reject the goods. The supplier did not
readily accept the situation but, since the buyer was
more powerful in the supply chain, they generally
accepted the consignment back. In this situation the
etiquette no longer applies and the transaction switches
to a parent-to-child situation with the supplier playing a
calculated game.
Although the transactions have to be estimated it is
possible to plot out the interaction between supplier
and buyer (from the buyer’s perspective) using the TA
terminology:
Fig. 2 TA for the electronic-auction loss leader
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1. The initial transaction is as follows: a call-off instruc-
tion indicating the quantity required as per pre-
arranged forecast was sent by the buyer to the
supplier. This is modelled as the adult-to-adult trans-
action 1 in Fig. 3.
2. The supplier responded by supplying the called-off
quantity of goods. This is again modelled as an
adult-to-adult response to the buyer as transaction 2.
3. The buyer had miscalculated the amount needed and
there was a considerable over-supply. There was a
significant number of transactions that took place
inside the buyer organization between purchasing
and senior management about what to do about the
over-supply. This is shown as transactions 3 and 4.
In transaction 3 there was an adult-to-parent message
from the purchasing department to the dominant
coalition in the business. The dominant coalition
took a critical parental stance instigating the parent-
to-child transaction 4 to the purchasing department.
The message from the dominant coalition was to
find a means of rejecting the delivery. A search for a
mechanism to reject the delivery was instigated and
a convenient reason found.
4. A message was then sent to the supplier, indicating
with reasons why the batch was being rejected. On
the surface this was an adult-to-adult transaction,
shown as transaction 5, but at the psychological
level this was a powerful parental injunction and the
underlying message that this was the supplier fault
and problem, shown as transaction 6.
5. The supplier, in a less powerful position, indicated
that they would take back the consignment. Although
they did not think it was justifiable, they took it back
primarily to maintain the relationship. This is shown
as transaction 7 while the underlying ulterior message
is 8.
In this situation the buyer had the power and the
supplier did not want to damage the business relationship.
The problem with the behaviour was that it lowered long-
term trust and encouraged both parties to continue to seek
opportunistic behaviour in the future. The framework and
culture at the buyer company were encouraging the buyers
in the purchasing department to adopt strategies to gain
short-term advantage at the expense of longer-term
benefit.
3.3 Case study 3: you may be powerful, but . . .
While negotiating for the business, the supplier agreed to
most of the terms and conditions set by the buyer and
entered into a long-term partnership at agreed and nego-
tiated prices. Some time after the business relationship
had been established, a lock-in situation had developed
which tended to give the supplier more power. The
supplier used objective reasoning backed by tools such
as activity-based costing to justify a pricing increase. In
this situation the buyer agreed when presented with the
facts.
The transactions took place over a significant time
interval. The approximate sequence of transactions was
as follows:
1. Initially power seemed to reside with the buyer and
the supplier agreed to all the requirements of the busi-
ness at a reduced price in order to win the contract. A
series of transactions occurred, associated with the
negotiation and establishment of the contract. These
were conducted on primarily an adult-to-adult
basis, shown as transaction 1 in Fig. 4.
2. After some time the supplier had become closely inte-
grated into the buyer’s product lines. The supplier
considered that it was strong enough to ask for a
price rise but it had to be based on some objective
data. This is shown as the surface adult-to-adult
transaction 2 with an ulterior message of ‘now that
we (the supplier) have more power, you have to pay
more’ shown as transaction 3.
3. A negotiation process took place and the buyer
agreed to most of the price increase. On the surface
this is the adult-to-adult transaction 4. However, at
a later time it invited the supplier to take part in an
Fig. 3 Searching for a quality problem
Fig. 4 You may be powerful, but . . .
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internet auction for the supply of the parts, but the
ulterior message was ‘we will get you later’ and this
is represented as transaction 5.
The example demonstrates that the two companies use
their perceived power to gain advantage. The game
playing that was taking place was overall damaging to
long-term relationships but maximized the benefit in
the short term. The only solution seemed to expose the
games and to encourage the two parties to act in a
more interdependent style.
4 DISCUSSION
TA provides a very valuable tool for displaying the
information transfer between partners in the supply
chain. It can represent the ulterior messages at the
same time as the psychological message and hence
provide a much richer picture about the transactions
than conventional information modelling tools. In this
research the concept of games has been used. The
games, as developed in TA, are repeating patterns of
transactions that occur between supply chain partners.
TA was applied to organizations by Berne himself with
the concepts of character, etiquette and technical culture
matching to the child, parent and adult states. However,
games in TA are generally carried out at an unconscious
level and relate to learnt patterns of behaviour and to
re-enforce beliefs about the self. Between organizations
the games are often more conscious and planned actions
corresponding to unspoken transaction strategies.
Rather than call these games it may be better to call
these deliberate strategic manoeuvres.
The information modelling capability of TA provides a
much ‘richer’ picture about what is being verbally and
non-verbally communicated thanmany other information
modelling tools. It is also possible to identify transactions
inside the organization that match the parental judge-
ments, the logical adult and the emotional child. One
difficulty in using TA is the interpretation of which part
of the ego state the messages are coming from. To a con-
siderable extent the theoretical base of TA does provide
guidance about recognizing whether it is a parent-to-
adult transaction or an adult-to-adult transaction, etc.,
and it was judged that, as organizational practitioners
gainedmore experience, it would become easier to identify
clearly the patterns of transaction. From the field work in
organizations it does seem likely that there are only a
limited number of games that occur in supply-chain inter-
actions There would be considerable value if this could be
verified and to determine what these patterns are. It would
also be worthwhile to determine whether these organiza-
tion games match the Berne games. An assumption of
this research is that organizations can be modelled in a
rather similar way to the individual in that there are
parental, child-like and adult transactions. Whether you
identify the organization in the same way as the individual
or not it was clearly observed in this research that there
were parental-type transactions, child-like transactions
and adult-like transactions regularly taking place within
any one organization.
An important question is, once game-like behaviour is
identified, what can be done about these rather negative
game-like patterns. It is not even obvious that any
companywould actually choose to be up front and to elim-
inate these games particularly if it is gaining some strategic
advantage and power from them. All the parties in the
transactions have to see these games as being negative
before any concerted action can take place to eliminate
the game-like behaviour; then the therapeutic methods of
TA would be appropriate. Being aware of the game and
having a deliberate strategy to interrupt the pattern of
transactions once identified would end the games. Also
using governance mechanisms similar to those defined by
Sandy Jap to control the incidence of opportunistic beha-
viour could significantly reduce the likelihood of games.
Finally, the research has shown the importance of power
in that the more powerful member generally sets the
rules and controls the game-like behaviour. To eliminate
games the use of power must be used wisely not to over-
whelm the other in the transactions. Much of the transac-
tion patterns appear to be a means of acquiring power in
the transaction process, primarily to leverage the maxi-
mum value for the organization. Although by far the
majority of the transactions observed were adult to
adult, the incidence of game-like behaviour increased in
problem situations. Where one party wanted to ensure
that it did not suffer loss or alternatively wanted to gain
advantage, gaming became obvious.
Now the three questions raised in section 3 are consid-
ered.
Are transactions between individuals strongly influenced
by the situational context and the power relations in the
organizations?
From the case studies the answer would appear to be
‘yes’. Where a strong situational strength has been
identified, then the transactions have primarily been at
the adult-to-adult level. However, where the situational
strength is weak, then gaming becomes more available
with the dominant partner instigating parent-to-child-
type transactions. Interestingly, the longer-term ‘ulterior’
transactions were primarily instigated by the weaker
partner to gain longer-term advantage.
Where the manipulation of power in the organization is
realized as games, is TA a valid representation of these
games?
Certainly, in the case studies investigated, it provides a
very useful short-hand demonstration of the transactions
taking place. It adds a new dimension to the understand-
ing of transactions between organizations since it
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considers more that just information flows. It shows the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the partners within a
set of transactions, enabling partners to identify problem
issues which would not be so apparent without the TA
methodology.
If the games arise from the individual or the organization,
is this contingent upon the strength of the situation?
From the case studies investigated, so far very little
evidence was found that individuals instigated games
on their own personal account. It is true that games
were initiated by individuals but in all cases this was
done to the supposed benefit of the employing company.
Significant loyalty to the company was seen in many
cases. However, where games were played, it was
aimed primarily at short-term benefit for the individuals’
company and not for long-term benefit of the partner-
ship.
5 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the present authors are of the opinion that
significant insight and benefit can be developed by
modelling supply chain interactions using TA and have
been impressed by the diagnostic capabilities of TA
and its capability as an information modelling tool. As
supply chains become increasingly lean and agile, their
overall performance becomes increasingly dependent
on maintaining mutual beneficial power relationships.
The holonic concept of supply chains can only be estab-
lished through co-operation, and co-operation is only
ensured by understanding power relationships. TA
provides a means for this understanding and hence
relationship management.
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